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ABORIGINAL TITLE IN THE COMMON LAW: A STONY
PATH THROUGH FEUDAL DOCTRINE
GORDON I. BENNET*
INTRODUCTION
Save perhaps in the United States, where assertions of tribal
sovereignty are fast becoming the predominant concern of native
Americans, the recognition and protection of land rights remain, for
obvious reasons, the focal point of aboriginal movements almost every-
where. Each country, of course, has answered aboriginal claims after
its own fashion. Divergent concepts of property law, infinite variations
in indigenous culture and in the forms of aboriginal tenure, the history
of conquest or settlement and the politics of land expansion: these and
a host of other factors have prevented an even response to the advance-
ment of native claims and have obscured the issues of general principle
to which such claims give rise. Indeed, in many countries these issues
have gone entirely by default; the physical isolation and political in-
significance of native peoples, which have led so often in the past to
their ruthless exploitation, have also encouraged successive governments
to postpone the development of a clearly articulated policy on the
ownership of aboriginal land.
The new radicalism of indigenous peoples, however, and the re-
cent emergence on the international scene of a "Fourth World," seem
almost certain to provoke a fresh spate of litigation in jurisdictions
where native claims have never previously been advanced. In the
absence of judicial precedents nearer home, courts confronted with such
claims are likely to seek guidance from the Anglo-American and Com-
monwealth jurisprudence in which the underlying theories of aborigi-
nal title were initially forged. Can the common law, which on many
occasions hitherto has exerted a positive influence on civilian and
mixed systems, once again show the resilience and versatility on which
it has so long prided itself? The brief survey indicates that only the
American courts have acquitted themselves with any distinction in this.
field, and that their brethren elsewhere have felt themselves far more
constrained by the feudal yoke of the common law exported intact
to the colonies and dominions. To the comparative lawyer, this in
turn may suggest that membership of the common law clan is less
important than the creation of a bold and politically sensitive judiciary,
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able and willing to discard the skeletons in its ancestral cupboard
when they are shown to have outlived their purposes.
I. POSSESSION AS THE ROOT OF NATIVE TITLE
Although both the content and methods of extinguishment of
native title have long been the subject of controversy, the fundamental
problems still revolve around the legal basis and origins of that title,
and it is -to this issue that the present article is addressed. Does title
arise from the fact of immemorial possession per se, or must it receive
executive or legislative recognition before the courts can act? On the
latter view governments that have decided neither for nor against na-
'tive title, because their tribal lands were previously thought to contain
so little of commercial or economic interest that their ownership was
never a live issue, may now deal with those lands, when programmes
of national expansion or the discovery of mineral wealth lend them a
new significance, as they would with vacant state property. And it is
precisely at this juncture, of course, that governments are least likely
to acknowledge gratuitously the existence of native title; that the in-
digenous inhabitants have hunted and roamed there since time im-
memorial will hardly be allowed to hinder programmes of economic
development. Governments may license the exploitation of aboriginal
lands by multi-national corporations and need not account to the
inhabitants for the revenue thereby obtained. Worse, the native com-
munity will have no legal remedy against the unlicensed operator who
often constitutes the most dangerous threat; without an official permit
the private entrepreneur is a trespasser on native land, but, since the
community is possessed of no title itself, it cannot sue in trespass or
obtain an injunction to prevent further encroachments.
Aboriginals cannot assert a prescriptive title to -their lands because
the common law doctrine of prescription applies only to adverse pos-
session. Since the aboriginal occupation of previously uninhabited
territory necessarily lacks this quality of adversity, it cannot be traced
to the presumed acquiescence of a previous owner which governs the
whole law of prescription.1 As a matter of simple justice, however, the
proposition that immemorial possession gives the possessor a right to
remain on the land, at least .until ithat right is lawfully extinguished,
appears self-evident. The notion that long occupation is to be deemed
lawful, in the absence of proof to the contrary, is as ancient as the
1. See Dalton v. Angus & Co., 6 App. Cas. 740, 773-74 (1881) (per Fry, 3.).
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concept of property itself; indeed, the right to use that which one has
created, possessed or occupied without wrongfully taking from another,
is fundamental to any legal system. The rights of first occupants have
been widely supported by moral philosophers (in particular, by the
followers of Rousseau), and in their early development almost all legal
systems acknowledged continuous use and occupation as the sole source
of title. Other methods of acquisition later evolved, but possessory
title remained a founding principle; so much so, that it was regarded
by Roman jurists as a rule of natural law which was immune from
challenge. With the advent of feudalism, which brought its own tor-
tuous logic, the royal grant came to supersede simple possession as the
root of title in many jurisdictions, but the common law continued
to regard possession itself as proof of ownership.2 The respect tra-
ditionally accorded to the fact of possession is reflected even in inter-
national law, where the principle of acquisition by occupation has
always regulated the status of newly discovered territories.
First to argue for the application of these principles to native
lands was the Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria, in De Indis
et de Jure Belli Relectiones.8 To those who claimed that the Indians
were tainted with mortal sin and incapable of reason, Vitoria responded
that all men, whatever their religion or creed, were entitled by virtue
of their humanity to respect for their possessions; hence, "the bar-
barians in question cannot be barred from being true owners, alike in
public and in private law, by reason of the sin of nonbelief or any
other mortal sin, nor does such sin entitle Christians to seize their
goods and lands."4 Vitoria's theory received papal support from the
Bull Sublimis Deus of 1537, in which Pope Paul III proclaimed:
[T]he said Indians and all other people who may later be discovered
by Christians, are by no means to be deprived of their liberty or the
possession of their property, even though they be outside the faith of
Jesus Christ; and that they may and should, freely and legitimately,
enjoy their liberty and the possession of their property; nor should
they be in any way enslaved; should the contrary happen, it shall be
null and of no effect.5
2. G. CHESHIRE, THE MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 659 (10th ed. 1967).
3. F. VrroRmA, DE INDIS ET DE JURE BELLI RELECTIONES § I 4-19 (E. Nys
trans. 1917). Throughout this work, Vitoria makes clear his basic premise that the
natives "in question were in peaceable occupation of their goods, both publicly and
privately. Therefore, unless the contrary is shown, they must be treated as owners and
not be disturbed in their possession unless cause be shown." Id. at 120.
4. Id. at 125.
5. Papal Ball Sublimis Deus, quoted in Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L.
REv. 28, 45 (1947).
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The Spanish Laws of the Indies (1594) contained provisions to a simi-
lar effect, and the Laws were clearly grounded in a belief that posses-
sion of itself demanded respect for the Indian title."
II. THE AMERICAN VIEW
This approach was shared by Spain's northern rivals,7 and it be-
came a guiding principle in the colonisation of North America. In the
United States the federal government adopted from its inception the
invariable practice of negotiating with the native Americans for the
surrender of their lands,8 and in all more than two million square
miles of territory have been purchased from the Indian tribes.9 Many
transactions were concluded on terms grossly unfair to the Indians,
but it was at least established beyond peradventure that their im-
memorial possession had given them a title to convey.
Where the executive led, the Supreme Court was not slow to fol-
low. In Johnson v. McIntosh ° and Worcester v. Georgia," two land-
mark decisions that still constitute the locus classicus on the subject,
Chief Justice Marshall referred to the principle evolved by the Euro-
pean powers in their settlement of America that "discovery gave title
to the government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, it was
made, against all other European governments, which title might be
6. The Laws commanded "that the farms and lands which may be granted to
Spaniards be so granted without prejudice to the Indians; and that such as may have
been granted to their prejudice and injury be restored to whoever they of right shall
belong." F. COHEN, THE LEoAL CONSCIENCE 243 (1960).
7.
There was a widespread, indeed almost universal, practice, which by the
time of the American Revolution was a respectable antiquity, of treating [sic]
with the Indians for the surrender of their lands, notwithstanding that in law
the title to the lands either had already been obtained or could be obtained
from a person with a good root of title in a Crown grant. 'The English govern-
ment purchased the alliance and dependence of the Indian nations by sub-
sidies, and purchased their lands when they were willing to sell, at a price
that they were willing to take, but they never coerced a surrender of them
.... ' This was not merely a practice adopted by colonists for selfish reasons,
to ensure good relations with the Indians, but a policy deliberately adopted by
home Governments.
Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd. [1971] 17 F.L.R. 141, 204 (Austl. Sup. Ct. N. Terr.);
(per Blackburn, J.) (quoting 3 KENT'S COMMENTARIES 384 (1827)).
8. See, e.g., Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923), where the Supreme
Court observed that "[u]nquestionably it has been the policy of the Federal Government
from the beginning to respect the Indian right of occupancy, which could only be inter-
fered with or determined by the United States." Id. at 227 (citations omitted).
9. F. COHEN, supra note 6, at 34.
10. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
11. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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consummated by possession."'' The Chief Justice added the vital
caveat, however, that this principle could not
annul the previous rights of those who had not agreed to it. It regu-
lated the right given by discovery among the European discoverers;
but could not affect the rights of those already in possession,'either
as aboriginal occupants, or as occupants by virtue of a discovery
made before the memory of man. It gave the exclusive right to pur-
chase, but did not found that right on a denial of the possessor to
sell.' 3 [The original inhabitants] were admitted to be the rightful oc-
cupants of the soil, with a legal as well as a just claim to retain pos-
session of it, and to use it according to their own discretion.14
Central to Marshall's analysis was the assertion that aboriginal rights
stem from ancient occupation per se, and are not dependent on a pub-
lic grant or official acknowledgment. In the leading modem judgment,
United States v. Santa Fe Pacific Railroad Co.,' 5 Justice Douglas spelt
this out in unequivocal terms:
Occupancy necessary to established aboriginal possession is a
question of fact to be determined as any other question of fact. If
it were established that the lands in question were, or were included
in, the ancestral home of the Walapais in the sense that they con-
stituted territory occupied exclusively by the Walapais ... then the
Walapais had "Indian title" which, unless extinguished, survived the
national grant of 1866 . . ..
Nor is it true, as respondent urges, that a tribal claim to any
particular lands must be based upon a treaty, statute, or other formal
government action.17
This view is confirmed by a whole cluster of Supreme Court de-
cisions and, most recently, by the Court of Claims in Lipan Apache
Tribe v. United States,'8 where Judge Davis dispelled any lingering
doubts:
Indian title based on aboriginal possession does not depend on sov-
ereign recognition or affirmative acceptance for its survival. Once
established in fact, it endures until extinguished or abandoned ....
12. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) at 573.
13. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 544.
14. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 574.
15. 314 U.S. 339 (1941).
16. Id. at 345 (citing Buttz v. Northern P.R.R., 119 U.S. 55 (1886)).
17. Id. at 347.
18. 180 Ct. CI. 487 (1967).
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The correct enquiry is, not whether the Republic of Texas accorded
or granted the Indians any rights, but whether that sovereign extin-
guished their pre-existing occupancy rights.19
III. THE COMMONWEALTH AuTHOmuTmS
Until 1924 the native American was an alien in his own country,
and was denied the protection of the Bill of Rights. At least in theory,
the aboriginal peoples of the British Empire were accorded more re-
spect. After the Abolition of Slavery Act of 1833,20 which was intended
not only to end chattel slavery but to ensure that Black people should
not be disadvantaged in law by their colour, aborigines throughout
the Empire were not slaves but citizens. As such they were entitled to
the full protection of the law. British courts might therefore have
been expected to rival, if not surpass, the judicial support of Indian
title in the United States. Such hopes have been sorely disappointed,
however, for the English and Commonwealth judges have shown them-
selves curiously unwilling to exploit the adaptability of the common
law to meet aboriginal needs. In In re Southern Rhodesia,21 for exam-
ple, the issue before the Judicial Committee of the Privy Committee
was the ownership of large tracts of land in the de facto control of the
British South Africa Company. Displaying an air of condescension
all too prevalent at the time, Lord Sumner paid tribute to the "dis-
interested liberality of persons in this country"2 which had secured
for the court "the advantage of hearing the case for the natives who
were themselves incapable of urging, and perhaps unconscious of
possessing, any case at all";23 and his Lordship went on to remark that:
Some tribes are so low in the scale of social organization that their
usages and conceptions of rights and duties are not to be reconciled
with the institutions or the legal ideas of civilized society. Such a
gulf cannot be bridged. It would be idle to impute to such people
some shadow of the rights known to our law and then to transmute
it into the substance of transferable rights of property as we know
them.2 4
But this is wholly to misconstrue the doctrine of native title. The
purpose is not to translate indigenous customs into "transferable rights
19. Id. at 492.
20. 1833, 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 73.
21. 11919] A.C. 211 (P.C. 1918).
22. Id. at 232.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 233-34.
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of property known to English law," but to accord proprietary status
to the existing, aboriginal system of land holding. The American ex-
perience has shown that what matters is the fact of aboriginal occupa-
tion, and the courts ought not to go behind the native system in search
of common law notions of property which communal native possession
neither knows nor requires.2
True, Lord Sumner's heresy has not gone unchallenged in the
Judicial Committee itself. Delivering judgment for a strong Committee
(of which Lord Sumner was not a member) in Tijani v. Secretary,
Southern Nigeria,2 6 Viscount Haldane inveighed against "a tendency,
operating at times unconsciously, to render [native] title conceptually
in terms which are appropriate only to systems which have grown up
under English law."'27 This warning has been echoed in other courts,
not entirely without effect, and in Oyekan v. Adele- Lord Denning
roundly declared that on the compulsory acquisition of aboriginal
lands "the courts will declare the inhabitants entitled to compensation
according -to their interests, even though those interests are of a kind
unknown to English law."'2 9
This confident prediction has not, however, been borne out by
subsequent developments elsewhere in the Commonwealth. In par-
ticular there is Millirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd.,10 which saw native
claims litigated for the first time in the Australian courts. The case
arose out of the fierce opposition of the Gove Peninsula Aborigines
to the grant of a mineral lease to a bauxite conglomerate in Arnhem
Land. In direct issue was the interpretation of the phrase "interest in
land" contained in section 5(1) of the Lands Acquisition Act 1955-
1966, relating to -the compulsory purchase of land on just terms.3 1
With admirable skill Mr. Justice Blackburn of the Supreme Court
of the Northern Territory negotiated the pitfalls of the hearsay rules,
to admit -the evidence of anthropologists and the native testimony of
statements made by deceased ancestors about the rights of various clans
to particular areas of land.32 From these materials emerged the picture
25. Cf. United States v. Seminole Indians, 180 Ct. C1. 375, 383-87 (1967) (United
States Court of Claims recognised the native American concept of communal property
and possession).
26. [1921) 2 A.C. 399 (P.C.) (Nigeria Sup. Ct.).
27. Id. at 403.
28. [1957] 1 W.L.R. 876 (P.C.) (W. Afr. Ct. App.).
29. Id. at 880.
30. [1971] 17 F.L.R. 141, 204 (Austl. Sup. Ct. N. Terr.).
31. Now the Lands Acquisition Act 1955-1973, 7 ACTs AUSTL. P. § 5 (1975).
32. [1971] 17 F.L.R. at 151-65.
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of a subtle and elaborate system of social customs highly adapted to
the local environment, in large measure free from the vagaries of
personal whim or influence, and regarded as obligatory by all mem-
bers of the clan. In short, there existed an effective system of law. But
judicial habits die hard; evoking the ghost of Lord Sumner, Justice
Blackburn held 'that the relationship of the native clans to the land
under 'that system was not recognisable as a right of property and was
not a "right, power or privilege over, or in connection with the land"83
within the meaning of the definition of "interest" in the Act.
If -the English and Commonwealth courts have been inconsistent
in their recognition of aboriginal tenure as an effective form of land
holding, even more equivocal has been their response to the conten-
tion that possession per se is a good root of title. In Canada, Indian
claimants to some regions can invoke the Royal Proclamation of 1763,
which reserves for the use of the several "Nations or Tribes of Indians
with whom We are connected" all the lands not included within the
limits of Quebec, East and West Florida, or the territory of the
Hudson Bay Company.34 But what of the lands outside these (still
controversial) boundaries? In St. Catherines Milling and Lumbering
Co. v. The Queen, 5 Mr. Justice Strong, of the Canadian Supreme
Court declared:
[I]f there had been an entire absence of any written legislative act
ordaining this rule as an express positive law, [i.e., the Royal Procla-
mation], we ought, just as the United States courts have done, to hold
that it nevertheless existed as a rule of the unwritten common law,
which the courts were bound to enforce as such .... 81
Moreover, the Proclamation itself, by its assumption 'that prior to
declaration the Crown had to obtain Indian lands by cession or pur-
chase 3 7 clearly recognised the pre-existing land rights of native peoples.
33. 7 ACTS AusT. P. § 5(1).
34. The Royal Proclamation of Oct. 7, 1763, reprinted in CAN. REv. STAT. app.
II, No. 1, at 127 (1970).
35. [1887] 13 Can. S. Ct. 577.
36. Id. at 613.
37. CAN. Rnv. STAT. app. II, No. 1, at 127 (1970). Its preamble states:
[I]t is just and reasonable, and essential to our Interest, and the Security of
our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes with whom We are connected,
and who live under our Protection, should not be molested or disturbed in
the Possession of such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having




On appeal, however, the Privy Council apparently regarded the Procla-
mation as the sole source of aboriginal rights:
Whilst there have been changes in the administrative authority,
there has been no change since the year 1763 in the character of
the interest which its Indian inhabitants had in the lands surrendered
by the treaty. Their possession, such as it was, can only be ascribed
to the general provisions made by the royal proclamation in favour
of all Indian tribes then living under the sovereignty and protection
of the British Crown.3s
Although these remarks were clearly obiter, and have not deterred a
number of Canadian judges from describing the Proclamation as merely
declaratory of aboriginal rights founded on immemorial possession, 9
they have perpetuated uncertainty as to the precise status of native
Canadians outside the geographic limits of the Proclamation itself.
In 1973 the Canadian Supreme Court was provided the oppor-
tunity at last 'to settle the weary controversy, but in a split decision
the Court managed only to sow the seeds of further confusion. Calder
v. Attorney General of British Columbia o arose out of an action
brought by officers of the Nishga Indian Tribal Council for a declara-
tion that their traditional rights in the Nash Valley of British Co-
lumbia had never been lawfully extinguished. The respondent At-
'torney General urged that, since the northern limit of the Province
had not been determined until 1846, the Nishga bands had not lived
under British protection in 1763, and were therefore outside the ambit
of the Royal Proclamation. 41 In a masterly analysis, Justice Hall
argued that even if this submission was upheld, it was in no way
conclusive of the issue. Canadian aboriginal 'title, he maintained, did
not depend on a grant of recognition by the discoverer but was in the
nature of a "pre-existing right of possession."' ' In the absence of some
positive indication that 'the Sovereign intended to extinguish that
right, aboriginal title continued.43 Two of Justice Hall's brethren
concurred in this view, but at least another three remained uncon-
38. St. Catherines Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen, [1888] 14 App. Gas. 46,
54 (P.C. 1889) (Can. Sup. Ct.).
39. See, e.g., Regina v. Koonungnak, 11963] 45 W.W.R. 282, 302-03 (N.W.T.);
Regina v. White & Bob, [1964] 52 W.W.R. 193, 211-18 (B.C.) (alternative holding per
Norris, J.); Regina v. Sikyea, [1964] 43 D.L.R.2d 150, 152, aff'd, [1964] Can. S. Ct.
642.
40. [1973] 34 D.L.R.3d 145.
41. Id. at 153-54 (per Judson, J.)
42. See id. at 173-74, 190-210 (Hall, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 208.
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vinced.44 These three justices did not find it necessary to determine
the question; in their judgment it was enough to find that, whatever
property right may once have existed, the several proclamations and
ordinances of British Columbia pertaining to the disposition of Crown
lands (albeit that they made no mention of the Indian tribes) re-
vealed an intention to exercise absolute sovereignty over all the lands
of the Province, and such exercise of sovereignty was irreconcilable
with any conflicting interests including an alleged aboriginal title.45
This reasoning is not easy to follow, for native tenure is entirely
consistent with the location of full sovereignty in the Crown. Far from
challenging the fee of the Crown, the Nishgas readily conceded its
ultimate title and asserted merely that they possessed a right of
occupation against all the world except the Crown-which the Crown
had not yet explicitly extinguished. That international sovereignty
and land tenure are separate concepts is amply illustrated by the
Louisiana Purchase from Napoleon for fifteen million dollars, and
the subsequent payment of twenty times that sum to those Indians
in the state who were willing to sell; or more recently, the nine
hundred and sixty two million dollars settlement of native claims in
Alaska, bought from Russia in 1867 for seven million pounds. 46
The Calder Court was also divided on the correct procedure to
be adopted in seeking a declaration of aboriginal title. The seventh
member of the bench, Justice Pigeon, ultimately sided with those
who ruled that in the absence of the Lieutenant-Governor's fiat the
Court had no jurisdiction to grant such a declaration, and it was on
this narrow ground that the Nishga claim was finally dismissed.47 The
Court could scarcely have contrived a less satisfactory result; presented
with the first chance in eighty years to clarify an issue of vital concern
to the Canadian Indian, it chose instead to retreat into a quagmire
of colonial precedent which was incapable of yielding the definitive
answer it sought.
Aboriginal aspirations have fared little better in Australia, as the
Nabalco4s case sadly illustrates. Blackburn's preliminary ruling on
the relationship of the aborigines to their ancestoral lands necessarily
disposed of their claim, but 'the learned judge went on to review (in
44. Id. at 148, 168, 223-26.
45. Id. at 167.
46. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1624 (1976).
47. [1973] 34 D.L.R.3d at 223-26.
48. Milirrpum v. Nabalco Pty. Ltd., [1971] 17 F.L.R. 141 (Austl. Sup. Ct. N.
Terr.) (per Blackburn, J.).
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a judgment of one hundred and forty-eight pages) the American,
African, Indian, Canadian and New Zealand authorities. This massive
survey led him 'to conclude that -the doctrine of communal native title
did not form, and had never formed, part of the law of Australia. On
the contrary, "In each case it must be shown that the aboriginal rights
were ensured by prerogative or legislative act, or that a course of
dealing has been proved from which that can be inferred."4 9 Crucial
to such a finding was the assertion that "the basis of title to land in
all [settled or occupied] colonies, whatever their kind of government,
was a grant from the Crown." 50 This flies in the face of not only the
great weight of authority supportive of aboriginal title in the United
States, but also the widespread Crown practice of purchasing land
from native tribes5' (why buy from those who have nothing to sell?).
For Justice Blackburn, however, the native lands policy of colonial
governments were to be explained (or explained away) in terms of
political expediency rather than of legal right. Thus the Nabalco
Court was driven to a conclusion which had as its inevitable but
extraordinary consequence that at the precise moment when, on the
26th of January, 1788, Captain Arthur Phillip raised a flag on a shore
in New South Wales, had a few muskets fired off and read a proclama-
tion, aborigines living some two thousand miles away in Arnhem Land
automatically forfeited entitlement to their lands.
IV. THE BLACKSTONE DOCTRINE
Why has the doctrine of aboriginal title received such shortshrift
in the Commonwealth courts? A principal factor has been the con-
straints imposed by that curious distinction, first advanced in Black-
stone's Commentaries and subsequently enshrined in Campbell v.
49. Id. at 222 (quoting with approval Calder v. Attorney-General, [1970] 13
D.L.R.3d 64, 67 (B.C. Ct. App.) (per Davey, C.J.), aff'd, [1973] 34 D.L.R.3d 145.
50. [1971] 17 F.L.R. at 203.
51. See, e.g., T. ELIAS, BRITISH COLONIAL LAW 233-34 (1962). It must be
added, however, that Australia itself appears to have been one of the rare exceptions
to this practice, for no part of the continent has ever been bought from the aborigines
by the Crown. This policy may have arisen in part from the absence among the
aborigines of even the simplest form of agriculture, signifying to the casual observer a
complete lack of attachment to the land; and in part from the low population density
and the lack of competition for the aborigines' allegiance by competing colonial powers.
See Pittock, Aboriginal Land Rights, 2 THE AUSTRALIAN EXPERIENCE (Rausion ed.
1971-1972). In Papua and New Guinea, however, where similar considerations applied,
the British Administration did nevertheless embark upon its usual policy of purchasing
from the native class. The legal complications of that policy were examined in Territory
of Papua and New Guinea v. Guba, [1973] 47 A.L.J.R. 621.
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Hall,52 between territories acquired by conquest or cession and those
"desert and uncultivated" lands acquired simply by settlement.58 In
the former, the colony was to be regarded as already possessed of in-
digenous laws, and those were to remain in force until altered or
extinguished by the conquering state. "[I]n conquered or ceded
countries," wrote Blackstone, "the king may indeed alter and change
those laws; but, till he does actually change them, the ancient laws of
the country remain . . . . -54 This principle accords with the doctrine
of acquired rights in international law,55 and was adopted by the
Judicial Committee in In re Southern Rhodesia.5 6 Where the Com-
mittee conceded that once native rights were shown to belong to the
category of rights of private property "upon a conquest it is to be
presumed, in the absence of express confiscation or subsequent ex-
propriatory legislation, -that the conqueror has respected them and
forborne to diminish or modify them. '57 Two years later, in Tijani v.
Secretary, Southern Nigeria,58 the Board considered the root of native
title in a ceded territory and observed in a similar vein that:
It is not admissible to conclude that the Grown is generally speaking
entitled to the beneficial ownership of the land as having so passed
to the Crown as to displace any presumptive title of the natives ....
A mere change of sovereignty is not to be presumed as meant to
disturb the rights of private owners; and the general terms of a
cession are prima facie to be construed accordingly.59
In relation to settled territories, however, Blackstone assumed that
no legal system worthy of the description had existed prior to English
settlement, and reasoned that the common law must therefore apply
automatically on the foundation of that settlement.60 (The words
"desert" and "uncultivated" were Blackstone's own, and were taken to
52. 98 Eng. Rep. 1045, 1047-48 (K.B. 1774) (per Mansfield, J.).
53. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *107.
54. Id.
55. The doctrine of acquired rights holds that a change of sovereignty cannot
deprive persons of "rights which have accrued under the regime of the old sovereign."
D. O'CONNELL, THE LAW OF STATE SUCCESSION 267 (1956). For a detailed discussion
of this doctrine see id. at 77-105. The doctrine has probably been most frequently in-
voked in the United States, where courts have held that private property rights in the
territories acquired from France, Spain, Mexico, and Russia survived the transfer intact.
See, e.g., id. at 79-85.
56. [1919] A.C. at 233-34.
57. Id. at 233.
58. [1921] 2 A.C. at 399.
59. Id. at 407.
60. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *107.
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include territories inhabited by so-called "primitive peoples").'" It
followed that preexisting indigenous rights might be cognisable in
lands won by the sword or by treaty but not, since ex hypothesi ab-
original title did not form part of the common law of England, in
territories acquired by discovery and settlement. Such lands were to
be regarded as terra incognita where no sovereign claims arose prior
to the white man's discovery, so that the doctrine of acquired rights
was thought to be untenable there and the only source of title was a
grant from the Crown. To hold otherwise would be to admit an
allodial tenure wholly at odds with feudal doctrines which, although
they had long since assumed a merely historical interest in their coun-
try of origin, were nevertheless shipped to the colonies as part of the
common law package. The way was thus paved for the emergence of
a proposition of truly startling arrogance: that not only did the civilised
nations acquire sovereignty by their "discovery" of lands already
peopled by indigenous inhabitants, but the right of those inhabitants
to continue in possession of their ancestoral homes must somehow
receive executive or legislative recognition before it could be admitted
to exist.
This theory was embraced by the Judicial Committee of -the Privy
Council in Hoani Te Heuheu Tukino v. Aotea District Maori Land
Board, 2 where it was observed that since Maori land was a settled
colony, the preexisting rights of -the natives were enforceable only to
the extent that they had been acknowledged by the sovereign. 63 It has
also plagued the Canadian judiciary in its treatment of native claims,6
and was central to the Nabalco ruling that indigenous title was un-
known in Australian law.65 In future litigation Blackstone may deal
further blows to the aboriginal cause in Guyana, Botswana and many
of the Pacific Islands acquired by British settlement.
It may be debated whether the United States was acquired by
conquest, cession or settlement. Blackstone himself placed the American
plantations in the category of conquered or ceded colonies, "being
obtained in the last century either by right of conquest and driving
out the natives (with what natural justice I shall not at present in-
quire), or by treaties."66 But as a matter of historical fact, those colonies
61. Id.
62. [1941] A.O. 308 (P.C.) (N.Z. Ct. App.).
63. Id. at 324-25.
64. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
65. See note 48 & accompanying text supra.
66. 1 W. BLAcKSTONE, supra note 53, at *107-08.
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which afterwards became the original States of the American Union
(with the exception of New York) were acquired by peaceful occupa-
tion by settlers who found no rivals but the Indians, and against them
rarely had to rely on military aggression. This accords with the views
of Chief Justice Marshall, who clearly evolved his theory of Indian
title on the footing that the European powers acquired sovereignty
over the continent by discovery and settlement, not by the sword.07
To his credit, however, the Chief Justice paid scant regard to the
precise constitutional status of the new territory and effectively ignored
the Blackstone doctrine. His successors have also invariably referred
the origin of Indian title to a date anterior to the Revolution, and
have uncovered no a priori concept of the common law demanding
the extinction rather than recognition of aboriginal rights. In New
Zealand, too, a country which was almost certainly acquired by settle-
ment rather than cession, the judiciary has clearly based the recognition
of Maori customary rights in land on common law principles.08
It is submitted that this is the better view, and that there is
no reason in logic or principle why the constitutional category allotted
(often fortuitously) to a particular territory should have any bearing
on -the existing rights enjoyed therein by the indigenous population.
Unless extinguished or modified by specific legislative or executive
provision, they should be presumed to remain as before. The Black-
stone doctrine rests upon the fallacious assumption, long since eroded
by modem anthropology, .that aboriginal communities who do not
happen to have been the victims of either conquest or treaty, are in-
capable of enjoying a proprietary relationship to the lands they have
held since time immemorial.6 9 It is also dependent upon a distinction
67. See 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 543-47.
68. See, e.g., Regina v. Symonds, [1847] N.Z. P.C. Gas. 387. The much cited
dictum of Judge Chapmen stressed:
Whatever may be the opinion of jurists as to the strength or weakness of the
native title, whatsoever may have been the past vague notions of the natives
of this country, whatever may be their present dearer and still growing con-
ception of their own domination over land, it cannot be too solemnly asserted
that it is entitled to be respected, that it cannot be extinguished (at least
in times of peace) otherwise than by the free consent of the native occupiers.
Id. at 390.
69. This is not to deny that'there are some indigenous groups, particularly those
which practice varying degrees of nomadism, to whom the notion of exclusive proprietary
rights remains an alien (and possibly unworkable) concept. Certain tribes may remain
on the same site for much of the year, undertaking foraging expeditions into the
surrounding territories at regular, even daily, intervals. Others may frequently move
their camp itself, sometimes leaving a few of their number behind and sometimes com-
pletely abandoning the site. Hunters and gatherers move reasonably within fairly re-
stricted areas and usually return at the same time of year to much the same locality,
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between conquest or cession and settlement which in practice is fre-
quently difficult to maintain, particularly where some regions in the
one-time colony may have been "pacified" by military force while
others were peacefully occupied side by side with the indigenous popu-
lation; and it is a distinction which bears no factual relation whatever
to the status of tribal communities inhabiting hitherto inaccessible
regions of the modem state. In the latter circumstances, the doctrine
is wholly inappropriate, as its application in Nabalco so vividly re-
veals: can a foothold on the east side of a sub-continent two thousand
miles wide really be sufficient in English law, as it certainly would
not be in international law,70 to confer not only sovereignty but also
title to the soil throughout a hinterland of nearly three million square
miles? Above all, the doctrine pays insufficient heed to the vital rule
that when the common law is transported overseas that law is to be
applied subject to local circumstances. In consequence, English laws
which are to be explained merely by English social or political condi-
tions have no operation in a colony.71 Although it was crucial to the
rational development of new territories, -the notion that all land titles
must derive from a superior lord was neither designed nor intended
to defeat the claims of groups who had inhabited those territories
centuries prior to the establishment of sovereign rights. The common
law's reluctance to countenance allodial title stemmed only from a
but group membership is often flexible and considerable inter-group movement may
result. In some instances exclusive territorial rights are maintained over those areas
and the natural resources they contain; in others, there may simply be a known associa-
tion between a particular group and a particular region, with no assertion of exclusive
use. The nature and degree of the possession required to support aboriginal title, how-
ever, and indeed the content of that title itself, raises issues beyond the scope of the
present article, which is merely concerned to show that the Blackstone doctrine is an
unnecessary obstacle to the effective disposal of native claims.
70. International courts have, in the past, occasionally been prepared to accept
that an intention to occupy the more remote areas of a territory, coupled with the
actual possession and settlement of a coastal strip, may suffice to establish sovereignty
over the whole territory. See, e.g., Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, [1933] P.G.I.J.,
ser. A/B, No. 43. But by the end of the nineteenth century, Sir Humphrey Wadlock had
observed, in discussing Britain's sovereignty dispute over the Falkland Islands, that
international law had decisively rejected geographical doctrines as distinct legal
roots of title and had made effective occupation the sole test of the establish-
ment of title to new lands. Geographic proximity, together with other geo-
graphical considerations, is certainly relevant, but as a fact assisting the deter-
mination of the limits of an effective occupation, not as an independent
source of title.
Waldock, Disputed Sovereignty in Falkland Islands Dependeiies, 25 BrT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 311, 342 (1948).
71. Blackstone himself made it clear that the colonists should "carry with them
only so much of the English law as is applicable to their own situation and the condition
of an infant colony . . . " 1 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 53, at *107.
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fear that sovereign powers might thereby be prejudiced, but the limited
content attributed to native title in the United States and elsewhere
has shown such fears to be groundless; for the title is typically con-
ceived as a merely inalienable, personal and usufructuary right of
occupancy falling far short of the white man's concept of ownership.
It is a burden on the paramount title of the Sovereign upon whose
continued goodwill it is dependent for its survival.72
Hence there is no intrinsic obstacle in the common law to the
recognition of immemorial possession as a root of aboriginal title. But
should that law fail to meet the challenge, might not Equity intervene
in its time-honoured fashion to avoid the injustice which would other-
wise result? Even if the state is regarded as the owner in fee simple
of aboriginal lands, as a matter of practice it has almost invariably
(in both the colonial and post-colonial eras) recognised a de facto
right of occupancy in the original inhabitants.7 3 (Municipal legislation
in many countries is also replete with reference to native lands held
"in trust" by the State.) 74 Moreover this policy of paternalism, dis-
tasteful although some of its aspects may now appear to aboriginals
themselves, has long been incorporated into customary international
law as the doctrine of guardianship.76 In theory -this principle of
benevolence might therefore be elevated into a collective, constructive
trust of the fee simple enforceable at the instance of its aboriginal
beneficiaries. The courts have often sought to distinguish, however,
between a trustee accounting to a beneficiary and the act of a sovereign
state dispensing justice to its subjects. Kinloch v. Secretary of State for
India in Council 6 a case which concerned booty of war in the Indian
Mutiny campaign, brought this distinction well to the fore. The leading
speech in the House of Lords was delivered by Lord Chancellor Sel-
borne, -who offered the following observations in the course of his
judgment:
Now the words "in trust for" are quite consistent with, and
indeed are the proper manner of expressing, every species of trust-
a trust not only as regards those matters which are the proper sub-
jects for an equitable jurisdiction to administer, but as respects higher
72. All of this became painfully apparent in Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States,
348 U.S. 272 (1955), where the Supreme Court denied any right of compensation for
the appropriation of Indian lands held only by aboriginal title.
73. See T. ELIAS, supra note 51, at 223-35.
74. See, e.g., Aborigines Act No. 7 of 1969, Stat. N.S.W. § 7(lxb) (1969). See
also note 82 infra.
75. See A. SNow, THE QuESTON OF ABORIGINES 31-55 (1921). This work was
prepared for the use of the United States delegation at the Versailles Conference.
76. 7 App. Cas. 619 (1882).
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matters, such as might take place between the Crown and public
officers discharging, under the directions of the Grown, duties or
functions belonging to the prerogative and to the authority of the
Grown. In the lower sense they are matters within the jurisdiction of,
and to be administered by, the ordinary Courts of Equity; in the
higher sense they are not.77
The disastrous consequences which may follow this classification
into "higher" and "lower" trusts (a classification which is not to be
found in any of -the textbooks) are well illustrated by Tito v. Wad-
dell,78 a recent decision in the English Court of Chancery. Perhaps the
most celebrated aboriginal litigation of recent years, the case gave rise
to the longest trial in English legal history. It concerned Ocean Island,
a small island in -the Pacific whose inhabitants were known as the
Banabams. Phosphate was discovered there in 1900 and in the same
year the Island became a British settlement. During the decades that
followed, vast quantities of the mineral were extracted under a series
of agreements with the British Phosphate Commissioners which gave
fixed royalties to the Banabams. Eventually these mining operations
so devastated the Island -that the entire population was forced to move
to one of the neighbouring Fiji Islands. Evidence produced at the trial
established that the Banabams had little knowledge of the value of
phosphates or of the effect of inflation, and -that in the negotiation
of these vital agreements they received minimal help from British
officialdom. As a result, claimed the Banabams, the rates of royalty
payable under certain transactions had been less than the proper rates;
and they alleged that in relation to those transactions the Crown had
been subject to a trust or fiduciary duty for the benefit of the plaintiff
Banabams or their predecessors. The Crown was therefore liable for
the difference between the amounts actually paid by way of royalty
and the amounts that ought to have been paid, a difference of several
million pounds sterling.
Vice-Chancellor Megarry found that there had indeed been grave
breaches of the governmental obligations owed to the Banabams. Even
Counsel for the Crown conceded that one of the Ordinances under
which royalties were fixed was "quite fearful," and the Vice-Chancellor
could not "see how the omission to encourage the Banabams to get
proper advice and assistance and to make haste slowly [in the negotia-
tion of new royalties] can possibly be called good government or be
proper discharge of the duties of trusteeship."7 9 For the presiding
77. Id. at 625-26.
78. [1977] 2 W.L.R. 496 (Eng. Ch.).
79. Id. at 515.
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judge of the Chancery Division to criticise the conduct of the British
Crown in this way is almost without precedent, and the Banabams
must have thought that they were at last to taste the sweet fruits of
victory.
However, their hopes were to be cruelly dashed by Megarry's ruling
that there was nothing in the Ordinances, or in the various instru-
ments or other documents relating to the administration of Ocean
Island, which sufficed to show that the Crown had undertaken any
enforceable trust or fiduciary obligation such as was alleged by the
Banabams. In reaching this verdict he regarded the Kinloch doctrine
of a "trust in the higher sense"80 as of crucial importance, and held
that "the determination whether an instrument has created a true trust
or a trust in a higher sense is a matter of construction, looking at
the whole of the instrument in question, its nature and effect, and,
I think, its context."8' Applying that approach to the case before him,
Megarry decided that the obligations of the Crown to the Banabams
had been governmental obligations throughout, and not fiduciary ob-
ligations enforceable in the courts, with the result ,that he found him-
self "powerless to give the Plaintiffs any relief in these matters."8 2
CONCLUSION
Should aboriginal title be by immemorial possession or contingent
on official recognition? The dilemma has embarrassed the Common-
80. See text accompanying note 77 supra.
81. [1977] 2 W.L.R. at 597.
82. Id. at 616. Compare with the approach in Te Teira Te Paea v. Te Rocra
Tareha, [1902] A.C. 56 (P.C.) (N.Z. Ct. App.) where an agreement between the Maoris
and the Government of New Zealand (later incorporated into the Mahaka and Waikare
District Act of 1870) provided that various blocks of land in New Zealand should be
allotted to various Maori claimants, and were to be "held in trust in the manner pro-
vided or as hereinafter to be provided by the General Assembly for native lands held
under trust." Agreement on Waikare-Mohaka District, June 13, 1870, New Zealand-
Maoris, reprinted in id. at 58. Despite the words of trust, the Judicial Committee of
the Privy Council held that in the circumstances of the case a particular named Maori
claimant took absolutely and free of any trusts. Id. at 72-73.
The most recent attempt by aborigines to enforce an equitable trust is Director
of Aboriginal and Islanders Advancement Corp. v. Peinkinna, [1978] 1 A.CG. -
(P.C.) (Queensl. Sup. Ct.) as yet reported only in The Times (London), Jan. 28,
1978. There some reserve aborigines sought a declaration that the Director had acted
in breach of an alleged public charitable trust for the benefit of aborigines resident
on the reserve, in that he had entered into a mining agreement with a bauxite com-
pany under which he was to receive a share of the profits accruing from the bauxite
extracted from the reserve, and was to hold that share on behalf of all Queensland
aborigines whether or not they lived on the reserve itself. Once again, however, the
Privy Council rejected the contention that the Director was bound by any such charitable
trust as the plaintiffs alleged. Id.
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wealth courts to an extent that their American counterparts must find
unfathomable, and it remains to be seen which route will be followed
in jurisdictions where the question has never previously been litigated.
In the absence of a compelling legislative or executive extinguishment,
these courts must be urged to accept the patent justice of the native
claim and to place that claim on its only logical basis-that of simple,
immemorial possession. Problems may well arise in establishing the
necessary continuity of possession and delineating its physical bound-
aries, particularly among those groups that still practice a greater or
lesser degree of nomadism. But in countries untrammelled by judicial
precedents on aboriginal rights, the recognition and effective imple-
mentation of those rights will surely not prove an insuperable task if
the spirit is willing; and it will be facilitated in many states by the
ratification of the I.L.O. Indigenous and Tribal Populations Con-
vention of 1957,83 which now requires as a matter of international ob-
ligation the acknowledgement of the rights of indigenous peoples over
their ancestral lands.8 4 Indeed, to those courts inclined 'to favor the
Nabalco doctrine an argument might well be addressed in Article 11
of the Convention, which declares that "[t]he right of ownership, col-
lective or individual, of the members of the population concerned
over the lands which these populations traditionally occupy shall be
recognised."8 5 Not even the Australian judiciary has suggested that the
allegedly prerequisite State or Crown grant must assume a particular
form; on the contrary, Mr. Justice Blackburn appeared to concede in
parts of his judgment that a grant might properly be inferred from a
course of executive conduct. It is therefore submitted that in those
countries whose government delegates voted in support of the Conven-
tion at the 1957 International Labour Conference, and whose national
legislatures subsequently approved the ratification of the Convention,
aboriginal litigants should be permitted to rely upon these actions as
evidence of an implied grant which is admissible in the municipal
courts. For many endangered communities, however, time is running
short. For them the real question, perhaps, is whether judicial inter-
vention will come too late to save -the few traditional hunting grounds
which remain from the ravenous appetites of bulldozers, pile-drivers
and concrete mixers.
83. Convention Concerning Integration of Indigenous Populations in Independent
Countries, June 26, 1957, 328 U.N.T.S. 247.
84. Id. at 256-59.
85. Id. at 256.
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